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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS UPON LEGISLATIVE
POWER TO ALTER INCIDENTS OF THE SHAREHOLDER'S
STATUS IN PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
BY WILLIAM CLARK SCHMIDT
If, in this day of bank failures, corporation receiverships, de-
faulting bonds and passed dividends one were to walk up to an
owner of twenty-five shares of stock in the American Telephone
and Telegraph Company' and question him as to the incidents of
his status as a shareholder in that corporation, his answer or
reply would probably consist of little more than a cynical smile.
The ordinary stockholder of today is resigned to his fate. If a
dividend is declared on his holdings he considers himself lucky,
almost as though he had received something for nothing. If
dividends are never declared and if the value of his shares de-
preciates he accepts such a loss as the result of his own fool-
ishness.
Perhaps in the last few years this characteristic laxity has
been disappearing to some extent, especially among the larger
stockholders, who have both greater interests to protect and a
greater knowledge of their rights with which to protect them.
But the important thing to note is that the average stockholder
is a small stockholder,2 and the tendency seems to be toward an
even greater dispersion of holdings. Add to this the fact that
the average stockholder is the ordinary garden variety of Ameri-
can citizen, lacking both the means and the knowledge necessary
to an adequate protection of his rights," and the problem becomes
even more acute. Thus it appears that the question as to what
are the incidents of the shareholder's status and how these inci-
dents may be protected is an important one, and one deserving of
more attention than it has been given. It is with this in mind
I Approximately 25 shares is the average individual holding in A, T&T.
The 18,662,275 outstanding shares are held by 700,851 persons. Moody's
Financial Service, 1933.
2The following figures will serve to illustrate the fact that the tendency
is toward small holdings in the hands of a great number of individuals.
Cities Service Co. 40,154,673 shares outstanding, 650,000 shareholders.
United States Steel Corp. 12,300,000 shares outstanding, 251,025 share-
holders. Radio Corp. of America 14,393,965 shares outstanding, 287,813
shareholders. General Motors 44,900,000 shares outstanding, 351,761 share-
holders. Moody's Financial Service, 1933.
3 Sears, The New Place of the Stockholder, p. 60.
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that an attempt will here be made to deal with some of the more
important rights of the shareholder and to determine how, if at
all, these rights are protected.
All of the many phases of this subject could not possibly be
adequately treated in a paper of this nature. The incidents re-
sulting from the shareholder's status in a corporation are many
and varied, 4 and several problems may revolve about each of
these several incidents. Thus this paper will be confined to an
attempt to discuss the constitutional protection that may be af-
forded the more important rights of the present day shareholder.
Because of the nature of the subject and the problems involved,
no clear cut division is possible, but for the sake of convenience,
and possibly greater clarity, the following topics will be treated
separately: Evercise of the Reserve Power-Generally; Dividend
Rights; Voting Rights; Stockholders' Liability and Stock Assess-
ments; The Pre-emptive Right; Merger and Change in Corporate
Enterprise.
I EXERCISE OF THE RESERVE POWER- GENERALLY
The problems arising under this topic are all the offspring
of the famous and oft-cited Dartmouth College Case.5 An ex-
tended discussion of this case is here unnecessary. Suffice it to
say that the United States Supreme Court held that a corporate
charter constituted a contract between the corporation and the
state and that this contract is within the constitutional clause
preventing the impairment of the obligation of contract by subse-
quent state legislation. Almost immediately it became apparent
to the various states that in creating corporations by the issu-
ance of charters they were establishing instrumentalities over
which they retained little or no control. To obviate this difficulty
and to protect themselves from the dire results that might other-
wise follow, the state legislatures were quick to seize upon the
suggestion made by Justice Story in his concurring opinion. He
pointed out that if a state legislature wished to amend or repeal
a corporate charter it should reserve the power to do so.7 State
'Sears, The New Place of the Stockholder, p. 198. Sears sets out four-
teen different rights, powers and remedies.
5 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) 4 Wheat 518, 4
L.Ed. 629.
6 United States Constitution, Art 1, Sec. 10.
74 L. Ed. 629, 1. c. 677.
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statute books or constitutions soon contained a reservation of the
power to alter, amend and repeal corporate charters, and those
states that did not make such statutory or constitutional reserva-
tions inserted a reserving clause in each individual charter.
The reservation of this power to alter, amend and repeal cor-
porate charters by no means put an end to all problems and
questions arising between state legislatures and corporations.
The effect was merely to change the form of the question. What
constitutes a valid exercise of this reserve power, or just what
may the legislatures do by virtue of these clauses? A slight
examination of the cases leads one to the conclusion that the
courts are still looking for the answer.
It can probably be said with a fair degree of certainty that a
majority of the courts have concluded that under this reserved
power the legislature can pass any legislation- that does not effect
a substantial impairment of the object of the charter grant and
does not destroy rights that have vested under that grant. This
seems to be the position taken by the United States Supreme
Court.8 Under this view of the cases the constitutional question
involved is one of due process of law, rather than impairment of
the obligation of contract. The cases presenting this view are all
careful to announce that the reserve power is not without limit,
but the only limitations expressed are that amendments and alter-
ations must be reasonable and consistent with the original object
of incorporation, and in no cases can vested rights be disturbed
or property taken without due process of law."
A few courts, namely those of New Jersey, Alabama and Utah,
have approached the problem differently and have placed other
limitations upon the exercise of the reserve power. The essence
of their approach and the result that follows is this: the ordinary
corporate set-up involves three contracts; that between the state
and the corporation, one between the corporation and the stock-
s Looker v. Maynard (1900) 179 U. S. 46, 45 L. Ed. 79: Spring Valley
Waterworks Co. v. Schottler (1884) 110 U. S. 347, 28 L. Ed. 173; New
York & N. E. R. R. Co. v. Bristol (1894) 151 U. S. 556, 38 L. Ed. 269;Greenwood v. Union Freight R. R. Co. (1882) 105 U. S. 131, 26 L. Ed. 961.9 Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin etc. Co. (1903) 192 U. S. 201, 48
L. Ed. 406; Stearns v. Minnesota (1900) 179 U. S. 223, 45 L. Ed. 162;
Lake Shore etc. R. Co. v. Smith (1898) 173 U. S. 690,43 L. Ed. 861; Shields
v. Ohio (1877) 95 U. S. 319, 24 L. Ed. 357; Fidelity Bldg. & Loan v. Thomp-
son (Tex: 1932) 51 S. W. (2d) 578.
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holders, and the contract of the stockholders inter sese.'0 Having
established this distinction between the contractual relationships
involved, these courts then go on to hold that the state's reserve
power extends only to the contract between the state and the cor-
poration."
The difference in these two approaches is of course readily
apparent, and in dealing with stockholders' rights the difference
becomes a profoundly important one. As was pointed out above,
under the majority view the only constitutional protection af-
forded the shareholder is under the due process clause,-2 but
under the approach taken by the courts of New Jersey, Utah and
Alabama there is also a question as to whether or not there is
an impairment of the obligation of contract. The latter is cer-
tainly a greater protection for the rights of the stockholder, as
will be shown later when the various rights are treated individu-
ally. As to most of the incidents of his status the shareholder
has no vested property rights within the due process clause, but
as to almost all of them he can prove a contract obligation that
would be protected by the Constitution.
It is submitted that the New Jersey, Alabama and Utah cases
have adopted the better and the only logically correct conclusion.
The amazing thing about those courts conforming to the majority
view is that they recognize the triple contractual relationship
involved, but then go on to hold the reserve power extends to
each of these contracts. 13 To reach this result these courts deal
in terms of "legislative intention" and "inclusion by implication,"
saying that it was the intention of the legislature to extend the
10 Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co. (1929) 34 F. (2d) 533;
Avondale Land Co. v. Shook (1911) 170 Ala. 379, 54 So. 268; Morris v.
American Public Utilities Co. (1923) 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696; Somer-
ville v. St. Louis Milling & Mining Co. (1912) 46 Mont 268, 127 Pac. 464;
Pronik v. Spirits Distributing Co. (1899) 58 N. J. E. 97, 42 At. 586; Garey
v. St. Joe Mining Co. (1907) 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369. The cases cited
point out the three contractual relationships. For further discussion on
this point see Berle & Means, Modern Corporation and Private Property,
at p. 23; also Stern, Limitation of the Power of a State Under a Reserved
Right to Amend or Repeal Charters of Incorporation, 53 Am. L. Reg. 1.
"Avondale Land Co. v. Shook (1911) 170 Ala. 379, 54 So. 268; Garey
v. St. Joe Mining Co. (1907) 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369; Berger v. United
States Steel (1902) 63 N. J. E. 80, 53 Atl. 68.
12 United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Sec. 1.
13 Somerville v. St. Louis Milling & Mining Co. (1912) 46 Mont. 268, 127
Pac. 464; Melaven v. Schmidt (1929) 34 N. M. 443, 283 Pac. 900; Coombes
v. Getz (1932) 285 U. S. 435, 76 L. Ed. 866.
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reserve power to all these relationships and therefore the reserve
power is a part of each by implication. The very origin of the
reserve power clauses refutes such reasoning. As was stated
before, these clauses came into being only to obviate difficulties
arising under the decision in the Dartmouth College Case, to
leave corporations in the same position they would have occupied
had the Supreme Court held in that case that charters are not
contracts within the meaning of the Constitution. Obviously, to
accomplish this the reserve power would not have to extend to
all the affairs of the corporation.14
Even if it is admitted that the intention of the legislatures,
in reserving the power to alter, amend and repeal corporate
charters, was to have the reservation go to all three contractual
relationships, the question still remains whether or not they had
the power to do this. Clearly the state is a party to only one of
these three contracts, so how can it reserve to itself the power
to change the other two? If the state has such authority it would
seem to follow that the legislature could pass a general act mak-
ing all private contracts subject to revision by subsequent legis-
lation.
Many of the courts evade this last difficulty by seizing upon
the fact that all three of these contracts are embodied in one
instrument, and hence, they say, the reserve power applies to
them all. 15 This is doing nothing more than subordinating sub-
stance to form; it ignores the realities of the situation. The
agreements of the stockholders, and of the corporation with the
stockholders are coupled with the actual charter or articles of
incorporation only as a matter of convenience, and perhaps for
the sake of permanence. In substance they are clearly separate
from the contract between the state and the corporation."0
The view, as to the exercise of the reserve power, herein sup-
ported, has been consistently followed by the courts of only three
states,1 7 but it is approved by several eminent writers on the law
14 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (1883) 18 Fed. 385, 1. c.
406; Avondale Land Co. v. Shook (1911) 170 Ala. 379, 54 So. 268, 1. c. 270;
Cook, Corporations (8th ed.) sec. 501.15 Dam Co. v. Gray (1849) 30 Me. 547; Oldtown & Lincoln R. Co. v.
Veasie (1855) 39 Me. 571.16 Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co. (1929) 34 F. (2d) 533.
17 New Jersey, Utah and Alabama. See supra, note 11.
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of corporations. Cook says, "There is a strong tendency in the
decisions, and a tendency which is deserving of the highest com-
mendation, to limit the power of the legislature to amend the
charter under this resrved power. It should be restricted to those
amendments only in which the state has a public interest. Any
attempt to use this power of amendment for the purpose of
authorizing a majority of the stockholders to force upon the mi-
nority a material change in the enterprise is contrary to law and
against the spirit of justice. Under such reserved power the
legislature has only the right to amend the charter which it
would have had in case the Dartmouth College Case had decided
that the federal Constitution did not apply to corporate charters.
The power to make a new contract for the stockholders is not
thereby given to the legislature. The legislature may repeal the
charter, but cannot force any stockholder into a contract against
his will. The best view taken of this reserved power is that under
it a fundamental amendment of the charter does not authorize
a majority of the stockholders to accept the amendment and
proceed, but that unanimous consent of the stockholders is neces-
sary. '
's
This general treatment of the subject as a whole has been
put here with the hope of better introducing the problems con-
rected with the individual incidents. Much of what has been said
will be applicable to each of the individual problems to be treated
hereafter.
II DIVIDENDS
Upon looking over the various individual incidents of the
shareholder's status, one is most likely to conclude that the most
important single incident, particularly from the stockholder's
point of view, is that one concerning dividends. The average
stockholder,19 who cannot hope by virtue of his holdings to gain
any measure of control over the corporate policies, purchases his
few shares with little else but the possibility of dividends in
is Cook, Corporations (8th ed.) Sec. 501. See also Stern, Limitation of
the Power of a State Under a Reserved Right to Amend or Repeal Charters
of Incorporation, 53 American Law Register 1; Berle & Means, Modem
Corporation and Private Property, p. 23; Power of States to Alter Charters,
31 Col. Law Rev. 1163.
'1 Supra, note 2.
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mind. This fact alone warrants the placing of this incident in a
position of prominence.
The fact that the right to dividends has been singled out as
one particular incident does not mean that it raises only a single
legal problem. The problems are many and varied, and they will
necessarily differ with the types of stock and the circumstances
of the corporation involved.
What seems to be the greatest protection for the stockholder's
right to dividends can be dismissed here with a mere statement
because it does not involve a constitutional question. The pro-
tection referred to is that afforded the shareholder by the courts
of equity, by which courts will entertain suits to prevent the
withholding of dividends for other than business reasons and to
prevent unauthorized discrimination 20 between stockholders in
the declaration and payment of dividends.21 Although the fact
does not clearly appear in many of the opinions, one can be quite
certain that these equity cases are based on the conception that
the directors stand in a fiduciary capacity toward their share-
holders.2 2 These cases point out the general rule that the earn-
ings or profits of a corporation remain the property of the cor-
poration as such, and the shareholders have no property interest
therein prior to the declaration of a dividend. Only the directors
have the power to declare dividends, and so long as this power
is not exercised arbitrarily the action, or inaction, of the directors
is final.23
The right to dividends gives rise to constitutional questions
chiefly in those cases involving preferred stock. Often a corpora-
tion will be in need of additional capital. Let us suppose that
under the existing capital structure of the corporation there are
20 Of course, some discrimination may be provided for by the charter,
such as that between preferred and common shareholders.
21 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (1919) 204 Mich. 459, 170 N. W. 668; Bassett
v. U. S. Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co. (1909) 75 N. J. E. 539, 73 Atl. 514;
Collins v. Portland Electric Power Co. (1926) 14 Fed. (2d) 671; Channon
v. H. Channon Co. (1920) 218 Ill. App. 397.2 2 Berle & Means, Modern Corporation and Private Property, p. 260 et. if.
23 Wilson v. American Ice Co. (1913) 206 Fed. 736 at p. 742: "Money
earned by a corporation remains the property of the corporation and does
not become the property of the stockholders, unless and until it is distributed
among them by the corporation .... (What is to be done with the earnings)
is to be determined by the directors . . . ; and, unless in case of fraud or
bad faith, their discretion in this respect cannot be controlled by the
courts.... ." See also Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. supra, note 21.
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outstanding two issues, common and preferred, and that the cor-
poration has not been able to pay a dividend on the common stock
for some time. Obviously an additional issue of common stock
would not be particularly attractive to investors, there being
little expectation of common dividends in the near future. To
meet this difficulty, and to offer an issue that will be marketable,
our corporation will probably attempt to create and sell a prior
preference stock. Immediately the original shareholders will set
up their howl, claiming, among other things, that their right to
dividends is impaired by this new issue. To make the consti-
tutional question a more clear-cut one, let us suppose that, the
attempt to issue this new stock is being made under the authority
of a statute passed by the state of incorporation subsequent to
the formation of our company. The complaining stockholders
might claim constitutional protection for their dividend rights
on two grounds: that they are being deprived of vested property
rights without due process of law; that if the statute authorizing
new issues is held to apply to this corporation, which was organ-
ized prior thereto, its effect is to impair the obligation of con-
tract.
On his first contention the complainant would probably not
get very far. The great weight of authority is that the right to
unearned dividends is not a vested one.24 The facts here supposed
are substantially the same as those in the case of General Invest-
ment Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co.25 In that case it was
held that the issuance of new stock with preference over existing
preferred stock does not violate vested rights.
Only one case has been found holding the right to dividends
as such to be a vested right. In the case of Allen v. White28 a
charter amendment, authorized by a statute subsequent to incor-
poration, attempted to change the method of profit distribution.
It was held that the stockholder's right to dividends was a vested
right that could not be so changed. While the court in the opinion
24 Gibbons v. Mahon (1890) 136 U. S. 549, 34 L. Ed. 525; General In-
vestment Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co. (1925) 98 N. J. E. 326, 129
AtI. 244; Peters v. U. S. Mortgage Co. (1921) 13 Del. Ch. 11, 114 At. 598;
Morris v. American Public Utilities Co. (1923) 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl.
696; Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe (1918) 247 U. S. 330, 62 L. Ed. 1142.
25 (1925) 98 N. J. E. 326, 129 Atl. 244.
26 (1919) 103 Nebr. 256, 171 N. W. 52.
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talks in terms of vested rights, it seems that the same result
might have been reached on another basis, since the amendment
complained of would have effected a fundamental change in the
corporation in other respects than distribution of profits.
Approaching the supposed case from the contract angle it is
possible to find more protection for the shareholder's right to
dividends. Whether or not the complainant would prevail on this
point would, of course, depend on whether or not the court
adopted the view supported in the first part of this paper. Does
the reserve power extend to the matter of dividends? It seems
quite clear that the agreement as to how dividends shall be paid
is a part of the contract of the stockholders inter sese,27 or of
that between the corporation and the stockholders. By no stretch
of the imagination can it be held a part of the contract between
the corporation and the state, nor does the state have a direct
public interest in the matter. Thus the reserve power of the
legislature could not be so extended without impairing the obli-
gation of contract.28 This has been the view adopted by the New
Jersey courts under their general policy regarding the exercise
of the reserve power.29 The fact that the statute is not direct,
but merely authorizes the stockholders to make the change with
the assent of a certain majority, does not change the matter.
The effect is the same, and the shareholder's original right to
dividends should not be changed without his consent.30
One of the clearest cases in point is that of Pronile v. Spirits
Distributing Co. 1 There an attempt was made to change the
dividend preferences of outstanding stock. When the change was
resisted by a stockholder the New Jersey court, clearly distin-
guishing the three contracts involved, held that the reserve power
did not extend to the contract between the corporation and its
shareholders, nor to that of the stockholders inter sese. At first
glance the case of GeneraZ Investment Co. v. American Hide &
27 Supra, note 10 & 11.
238 Supra, note 11.29 Pronik v. Spirits Distributing Co. (1899) 58 N. J. E. 97, 42 Atl. 586;
General Investment Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co. (1925) 98 N. J. E.
326, 129 Atl. 244; Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile
Marine Co. (1927) 101 N. J. E. 554, 139 Atl. 50.
3 0Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine Co. (1927)
101 N. J. E. 554, 139 Atl. 50.31 (1899) 59 N. J. E. 97, 42 At]. 586.
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Leather Co. 2 3 might seem to be contra to the usual New Jersey
view, but it is important to note that that case did not involve
subsequent legislation and that the change was in accordance
with provisions that were definitely a part of the contract be-
tween the corporation and the shareholders.
The other view is well illustrated by the case of Hinckley v.
Schwarzschild-Sulzberger Co 23 At the time the corporation in-
volved was organized the Corporation Laws of New York re-
quired the unanimous consent of shareholders for the issuance
of preferred stock. Subsequently a statute was passed allowing
such stock to be issued with the assent of two-thirds of the stock-
holders. A common stockholder sought to enjoin an issue pro-
posed in compliance with that statute, but the court held that
the statute constituted a valid exercise of the reserve power, and
thus it did not impair any vested rights or contractual obliga-
tions. 34
When we come to the cases involving cumulative preferred
stock we find that the problem is magnified by the cumulative
provision and that the courts have afforded the holder of this
class of stock a greater measure of protection as to his dividend
rights. Of course, the cumulative provision guarantees the holder
a certain annual dividend, and if the earnings of any one year
are not sufficient to warrant the payment of this dividend, it
must be paid out of future earnings before any dividends can be
paid on the junior classes of stock. So, if after several such
dividends have been passed, the corporation proposes to change
dividend rights on its stock and to wipe out the amount owing
on these passed dividends, the holder of such shares has a just
complaint. The cases are pretty well in accord on the proposi-
tion that dividends that are accrued but unpaid under a cumula-
tive provision constitute vested rights that cannot be divested by
amendment under the reserve power.35
82 (1925) 98 N. J. E. 326, 129 Atl. 244.
32 (1905) 95 N. Y. Supp. 357.
at See also Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co. (1928) 16 Del. Ch. 157,
142 Atl. 654; Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co. (1929) 34 Fed. (2d)
533; Morris v. American Public Utilities Co. (1923) 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122
Atl. 696.
35 Morris v. American Public Utilities Co. (1923) 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122
At. 696; Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine Co.
(1927) 101 N. J. E. 554, 139 Atl. 50; Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel
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Before leaving the subject of dividends it might be well to
point out that the problems raised and discussed here will prob-
ably not arise with such frequency in the future. This is so
because it is now the practice of most corporations when orig-
inally organized and when issuing stock to provide that there
may be new issues with the consent of a certain majority of the
stockholders. Thus the stockholder takes his shares subject to
this provision, which is really part of the contract between the
corporation and the shareholder, and he can have no complaint
when there is a new issue. Some might be prone to think that
such provisions are a detriment to the stockholder, but so long
as those in control exercise their powers in good faith the stock-
holder is probably greatly benefited. There are many times when
a corporation is in need of immediate capital. If the assent of
every stockholder had to be obtained before the needed capital
could be acquired with a new issue, the entire plans and policies
of the corporation might be blocked, even though these plans
and policies are actually beneficial to the corporation and the
stockholders as a whole. Such conditions also offer wonderful
opportunities for the corporate trouble-maker, and such rascals
are not unknown. 8 The courts of equity afford the shareholder
adequate protection against fraudulent or arbitrary action by
the directors or those in power. 37
III VOTING RIGHTS
The right to vote in the election of directors and on certain
corporate policies was originally one of the most prominent
features of being the holder of shares of stock in a corporation.
This was particularly true when corporations were small and
when stock in each corporation was closely held by a select group
who had bought their stock with the express purpose of exercis-
Co. (1929) 34 Fed. (2d) 533; Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co. (1906) 184
N. Y. 257; Colgate v. United States Leather Co. (1907) 73 N. J. E. 72, 67
Atl. 657. Many of these cases point out that these accrued dividends are in
the nature of a debt, although the shareholder is not technically a creditor
of the corporation.
86 One Venner is a perfect example. His name will be found innumerable
times in the reports as party plaintiff to a suit against a corporation, he
usually being a very small shareholder and standing on some very technical
right.
37 Berle & Means, Moder Corporation and Private Property, see chapter
on Corporate Powers As Powers in Trust.
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ing some control over the company. With the advent of large
corporations and small holdings in many hands, the right to
vote has decreased in importance so far as the average stock-
holder is concerned. Furthermore, it has become the practice of
many corporations to issue non-voting stock to the general in-
vesting public and to confine the voting stock to a particular
group that is to run the company's business.
The cases seem to present the problem in three divisions: can
the right of vote, once granted, be taken away entirely; can the
method of voting be changed; are voting trusts valid? It can
be said, though with some reservation, that there is a tendency
to hold the right to vote to be of little actual importance or value
to the average stockholder. Many cases can be found upholding,
as a valid exercise of the reserve power, statutes changing vot-
ing rights.3a
In spite of the tendency pointed out, few cases can be found
holding that the voting right can be entirely taken from the
shareholder once it has been given him. The best view on this
point is well expressed in the case of Lord v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society.39 In that case a corporate reorganization
was attempted, one effect of which would have been to extinguish
the voting rights of the original shareholders. When a stock-
holder complained his right to vote was preserved by the courts.
In his opinion Justice Vann said, "The right to vote for directors
is the right to protect property from loss and make it effective
in earning dividends. In other words, it is the right which gives
the property value and is part of the property itself, for it cannot
be separated therefrom. . . .To absolutely deprive him (the
stockholder) of the right to vote is to deprive him of an essential
attribute of his property. Under ordinary circumstances the
Legislature could not by direct action essentially impair the right
to vote, nor could it do so indirectly, by authorizing the directors,
s8 In re Morse (1928) 247 N. Y. 290, 160 N. E. 374; Looker v. Maynard
(1900) 179 U. S. 46, 45 L. Ed. 79; Gregg v. Granby Mining & Smelting Co.
(1901) 164 Mo. 616, 65 S. W. 312; Miller v. State (1873) 15 Wall. 478, 21
L. Ed. 98; In re Sharood Shoe Corp. (1912) 192 Fed. 949; Harden v.
Eastern States Public Utilities Co. (1923) 14 Del. Ch. 156, 122 Atl. 705;
Morris v. American Public Utilities Co. (1923) 14 Del. Ch. 137, 122 Atl.
696; Page v. Whittenton Mfg. Co. (1912) 211 Mass. 424, 97 N. E. 1006.39 (1909) 194 N. Y. 212, 87 N. E. 443.
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with the consent of only a majority of the stockholders, to so
amend the charter as to have that effect."40
It is apparent in the case discussed that the decision was based
on the fact that the right to vote is a vested property right, the
divestment of which, in the manner proposed, would constitute
a denial of due process of law. Obviously the same result can be
reached on the contract theory. That the voting right is a matter
of internal affairs of the corporation, a matter between the cor-
poration and its stockholders or a matter among the stockholders
inter sese, can hardly be questioned. It is clear that if we adopt
the view that the reserve power extends only to the contract
between the coporation and the state, any statute attempting to
affect voting rights would impair the obligations of contract.
Again a New Jersey case is found to best illustrate the appli-
cation of the contract theory. That case is Matter Of Election
Of Directors.41 The Newark Library Association was incorpo-
rated in 1847, subject to the legislature's reserve power. At the
time of incorporation it was provided that stockholders should
have one vote per share up to five shares, and one vote for each
five shares over that number. In 1897 the New Jersey Legisla-
ture passed an act giving stockholders one vote for each share,
regardless of the number of shares held. In holding the Act of
1897 invalid as to this corporation the court clearly pointed out
that the method of voting is a contract or agreement between
the shareholders, and that this contract is not to be impaired by
subsequent legislation, the reserve power not extending thereto.42
When we come to the question of changing the method of
voting, without entirely negating the right, we are chiefly con-
cerned with statutes authorizing cumulative voting. These
statutes authorize a shareholder, at an election of directors, to
cast a number of votes equal to the number of shares he holds,
40 87 N. E. 443, 448 & 449.
4' (1899) 64 N. J. L. 217, 43 Atl. 435.
42 This case was reversed on a subsequent appeal. (1900) 64 N. J. L.
265, 45 Atl. 622. The reversal was on the ground that the corporation was
primarily an educational institution effected with a public interest, and
furthermore there appeared to be no real objection to the new voting plan.
This reversal did not disturb the theory on which the lower court based its
decision. For other New Jersey cases in point see Berger v. United States
Steel Corp. (1902) 63 N. J. E. 506, 53 AtI. 14; Colgate v. United States
Leather Co. (1907) 73 N. J. E. 72, 67 Atl. 657; Outwater v. Public Service
Corporation (1928) 103 N. J. E. 461, 143 Atl. 729.
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multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. He may cast
this entire number of votes for one officer or he may distribute
them.' 3 The purpose of these statutes, of course, is to give a
minority the opportunity of getting at least one representative
on the board of directors. When such a statute is passed some
of the stockholders, principally those in the majority group, are
adversely affected thereby, and many of them have taken their
troubles to the courts.
The majority of the courts seem to hold that these cumulative
voting statutes are a valid exercise of the reserve power. Such
a view was recited by the United States Supreme Court in
Looker v. Maynard."4 The court points out that because of the
reserve power there was no impairment of contract obligations,
and since the right to vote is not a vested right there was no de-
nial of due process of law. Although the impairment of contrac-
tual obligations is mentioned the court seems to base its decision
almost wholly on the other point. The reasoning in the opinion
is unsatisfactory, the court relying almost entirely upon two
previous cases, Sherman v. Smith" and Miller v. New York. 46
Neither of these two cases seem competent authority for the de-
cision in Looker v. Maynard.47 In the first case mentioned the
stockholder took his stock subject to an express provision author-
izing the change he later complained of. The Miller case seems
poor authority for two reasons: The case involved a railroad,
over which the state has a greater degree of control in the exer-
cise of its police power without regard to the reserve power;
there was a dissenting opinion in the case pointing out that the
reserve power could not extend to the contract of the stockholders
inter sese.48
Applying the contract theory to these cases it is certain that
the opposite result would be reached. The dissenting opinion in
the principal case is authority for such a statement.49 No New
Jersey cases in point have been found, as evidently that state
49 See Missouri Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 5.
44 (1900) 179 U. S. 46, 45 L. Ed. 79.
45 (1862) 1 Black 585, 17 L. Ed. 163.46 (1873) 15 Wall. 478, 21 L. Ed. 98.
47 Supra, note 44.
49 Justice Bradley's dissenting opinion; concurred in by Justice Field, 21
L. Ed. 98, 104.
49 Supra, note 48.
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has never had a provision for cumulative voting. However, the
Newark Library Casero and the case cited therewith," clearly
indicate that such a statute would be held an impairment of the
obligation of the contract of the stockholders inter sese.
The use of the voting trust device gives rise to some interest-
ing problems, but since no constitutional questions are involved
an extended discussion is here unnecessary. A reading of the
cases discloses the fact that the general rule is set out in the
leading Shepaug Voting Trust Cases52 where it was held that
voting trusts are void as against public policy because they in-
volve a separation of the voting power and the beneficial interest.
The theory behind the rule is that the stockholder having the
beneficial interest coupled with the voting power will most likely
exercise that power for the benefit of the corporation and the
stockholders as a whole, whereas, on the other hand, if one holds
the voting power without any beneficial interest it is quite possi-
ble that he will use his power to subserve his own ends without
regard to the better interests of the corporation and its stock-
holder. Although the Shepaug Voting Trust Cases were the first
in point, the rule they announced has been quite generally fol-
lowed 3 Some qualifications have been placed upon the rule, and
voting trusts have been held valid when they are clearly for the
benefit of all concerned and when the voting power is not irre-
vocably separated from the beneficial interest. 4 In New York
the problem has been settled by statute, and any voting trust
conforming to the statute is valid.5
IV STOCKHOLDER'S LIABILITY AND STOCK ASSESSMENTS
The chief consideration of the ordinary stockholder, so far as
his shares are concerned, is his pocketbook. When he purchases
his stock and pays for it in full, he assumes that the most he
60 Supra, note 41.
51 Supra, note 42.
52 Bostwick v. Chapman (1890) 60 Conn. 553, 24 Atl. 32.
53Bache v. Central Leather Co. (1911) 78 N. J. E. 484, 81 At]. 571;
Thomas Maddock Co. v. Beardot (1913) 81 N. J. E. 233, 87 Atl. 66; Bill-
ings v. Marshall Furnace Co. (1920) 210 Mich. 1, 177 N. W. 222.54Brightman v. Bates (1900) 175 Mass. 105, 55 N. E. 809; Carnagie
Trust Co. v. Security Life Insurance Co. (1912) 111 Va. 1, 68 S. E. 412;
Thompson-Starrett Co. v. E. B. Ellis Granite Co. (1912) 86 Vt. 282, 84
At]. 1017.
55New Stock Corporation Law, Sec. 50 as amended by Laws of 1925
c. 120. See In re Morse (1928) 247 N. Y. 290, 160 N. E. 374.
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can lose is the amount of his original investment. However,
many of the cases lead one to the conclusion that he is not en-
tirely correct in this assumption. It would be a great surprise
to most stockholders to learn that the stock they hold and have
paid for in full may be subject to future assessments or addi-
tional liability.
It seems to be the general rule that when the charter, or law
under which the corporation was organized, is subject to the
reserve power, subsequent statutory or constitutional provisions
for additional liability are perfectly valid, and they are held to be
applicable to prior stockholders, or to holders of stock previously
issued, or to stockholders of corporations previously organized.r8
It will be noticed that the cases cited as authority for the rule
stated, all involve the liability of stockholders for corporate debts,
and that this liability is sought to be imposed under statutes
enacted subsequent to incorporation. The apparent harshness
of the rule and the unexpected results that it may produce might
lead one to believe that it is unjust, but a closer examination of
the problem will show that the rule is founded on sound princi-
ples. As was well pointed out in the case of Perkins v. Coffin,57
the problem does not really involve any of the three contracts
which result from the corporate set-up, unless it is the contract
between the state and the corporation. Nor is the reserve power
necessarily involved. Although some of the courts do speak of
these cases as a valid exercise of the reserve power,58 it is clear
that they are more easily justified under the states' police power.
Obviously there are many public interests involved, and the state
can exercise its police power for the protection of creditors. The
public interests are multiplied in those cases involving banking
corporations, and it will be found that the majority of cases in
point do involve such institutions.
The problem of stock assessments presents more and greater
difficulties than that of stockholders' liability. There may be
56 Sherman v. Smith (1862) 1 Black 587, 17 L. Ed. 163; Maxwell v.
Thompson (1921) 195 App. Div. 616, 186 N. Y. S. 208; Perkins v. Coffin
(1911) 84 Conn. 275, 79 Atl. 1070; Melaven v. Schmidt (1929) 34 N. M.
443, 283 Pac. 900; Fredericks v. Hammons (1928) 33 Ariz. 323, 264 Pac.
687. Contra, Schramm v. Done (1930) 135 Ore. 16, 293 Pac. 931.
By (1911) 84 Conn. 275, 79 Atl. 1070.
8 Fredericks v. Hammons (1928) 33 Ariz. 323, 264 Pac. 687.
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times when a corporation is in need of additional capital, and it
does not wish to float new stock or bond issues to raise this
capital. An assessment of the stockholders may then be at-
tempted as a means of raising the needed funds. To present the
issue more clearly let us suppose that at the time of incorporation
it was provided that the stock should not be assessed without
the unanimous consent of the shareholders. Subsequent to in-
corporation the legislature, acting under the reserve power,
passes an act permitting corporations to levy stock assessments
with the assent of a certain majority of the stockholders. A
minority shareholder complains of an assessment attempted in
compliance with the statute and carries his complaints to the
courts. The cases are in conflict as to what his rights are in the
matter, and whether or not they are protected in any way. D
The issue outlined above was squarely presented in the case
of Somerville v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co.10D The Montana
court clearly distinguished the three contracts involved, but then
went on to hold that the reserve power extended to all three.
The decision is based chiefly on a previous Montana case"' in-
volving the exercise of the reserve power. The result is clearly
in accord with the general rule regarding the exercise of the
reserve power.0 2
The case of Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co.ca involved the same
issue, but the Utah court reached the opposite result by holding
the statute, as applied, to constitute an impairment of the obliga-
tion of contract. This, of course, was based on the theory that
the reserve power extends only to the contract between the state
and the corporation, and as a result greater protection is afforded
the shareholder. The case of Enterprise Diteh Co. v. Mafflt'
reached a similar result, but the decision is based on the theory
of vested rights rather than contract rights. It is the only case
found holding the right to limited liability to be a vested right.
r9 Somerville v. St. Louis Milling & Mining Co. (1912) 46 Mont. 268,
127 Pac. 464; Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co. (1907) 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac.
369; Enterprise Ditch Co. v. Maffit (1899) 58 Nebr. 642, 79 N. W. 650.
60 (1912) 46 Mont. 268, 127 Pac. 464.
61 Allen v. Ajax Mining Co. (1904) 30 Mont. 490, 77 Pac. 47.
62 Supra, notes 8 and 9.
63 (1907) 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369.
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V THE PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHT
The pre-emptive right is, in essence, the right of each share-
holder to maintain his original position in the corporation. That
is, if the corporation as originally organized issues one thousand
shares and a particular shareholder owns one hundred of these
shares, he has a right to one-tenth of the dividends, a right to
one-tenth of the assets upon dissolution, and he also holds one-
tenth of the voting power. If, subsequently, the corporation
issues additional shares, the shareholder must have an opportu-
nity to subscribe to one-tenth of this new issue if he is to main-
tain his original position. It is the pre-emptive right that gives
him this opportunity.5
This right seems to have been first announced in the case of
Gray v. Portland Bank.66 Gray was awarded damages because
his application, as a shareholder, for part of a new issue was
denied. The exact basis for the decision is not made clear by a
reading of the opinion. Sewall, J. seems to imply that under the
charter the original shareholders were entitled to pro rata sub-
scriptions, and that if they did not subscribe voluntarily, the
corporation could compel the subscription. 17 On the other hand
the opinion of Sedgwick, J. seems to say that the original share-
holders have an option to subscribe, which option cannot be taken
away by arbitrary action on the part of the directors. Thus he
would seem to allow recovery because the directors violated a
duty imposed upon them by their fiduciary capacity. 8 Regard-
less of what may have been the real basis for the decision this is
considered the leading case on the point and the one that estab-
lished the pre-emptive right.
The later cases, which proceed on the precedent established
by the principal case, reach the conclusion that this pre-emptive
right is a property right belonging to the shareholder, a right
that he acquires by virtue of his status as a shareholder.69 If
64 (1899) 58 Nebr. 642, 79 N. W. 650.
65 The illustration involves the simplest corporate structure. The prob-
lems are a bit more complicated when there are several classes of stock
outstanding, with different preferences and participation rights, but funda-
mentally the problems and the rights are the same.
64 (1807) 3 Mass. 364.
67 (1807) 3 Mass. 364, 1. c. 375.
8S (1807) 3 Mass. 364, 1. c. 382.
60 Luther v. C. J. Luther Co. (1903) 118 Wis. 112, 94 N. W. 69; Stokes
v. Continental Trust Co. (1906) 186 N. Y. 285, 78 N. E. 1090; Petrie v.
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the pre-emptive right is such a vested right, it is, of course,
constitutionally protected. Subsequent legislation could not take
away the right without violating due process of law. This, how-
ever, does not mean that a corporation at the time of its organi-
zation could not, by agreement with the shareholders, prevent
this right from ever coming into existence.
In considering the pre-emptive right several situations must
be distinguished from the simple situation outlined above. This
right is pretty closely confined to new stock issued for the pur-
pose of increasing the capital of the corporation.7 0 The stock-
holder has no option on a new issue, the purpose of which is to
take over another corporation. 71 In such a case the shareholder
is in no way prejudiced, for his shares are still represented by
the same amount of corporate property, and his proportionate
interest is substantially the same. Nor does the pre-emptive
right extend to the sale of treasury stock.7 2 The sale of such
stock in no way alters the shareholder's original position; his
proportion to the original amount of stock remains as before.
Furthermore, shares authorized but unissued are to be distin-
guished from new issues. When such shares are sold the existing
shareholders cannot claim a pre-emptive right with regard
thereto. 73 Here again the stockholder cannot complain that his
proportionate interests are reduced.
The desirability of upholding the pre-emptive right doctrine
under present corporate conditions has been seriously questioned
by some writers. It has been pointed out that "in large corpora-
tions with scattered holdings, the advantage to the shareholders
in creating an effective means of obtaining new capital on favor-
able terms, would more than make up for the possible dilution
of potential minority voting strength.174 It has also been pointed
Bruce (1928) 157 Tenn. 131, 7 S. W. (2d) 43; Titus v. Paul State Bank(1919) 32 Ida. 23, 179 Pac. 514; Dunn v. Acme Auto & Garage Co. (1918)
168 Wis. 128, 169 N. W. 297; Hammer v. Cash (Wis. 1920) 173 N. V. 465;
Thom v. Baltimore Trust Co. (Md. 1930) 148 Ati. 234.
70 Thorn v. Baltimore Trust Co. (Md. 1930) 148 At. 234, points out that
the pre-emptive right is limited to stock issued for money needed to in-
crease the company's cash assets.
71 Supra, note 70.
72 Borg v. International Silver Co. (1925) 11 Fed. (2d) 147.
73 Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage (1930) 253 N. Y. 274.74 Drinker, The Pre-emptive Right Of Shareholders, 43 Harv. Law Rev.
586. The writer suggests that incorporators should be required by statute
Washington University Open Scholarship
LEGISLATIVE LIMITATIONS & SHAREHOLDER'S STATUS 31
out that the fiduciary concept of the directors' position is suffi-
cient to protect the shareholder in the maintenance of his pro-
portionate interests7 5
VI MERGER AND CHANGE IN THE CORPORATE ENTERPRISE
When two corporations carrying on similar or closely allied
business enterprises seek to merge and continue as a single
corporation, the transactions necessary to effect such a combina-
tion may necessarily alter the rights of the shareholders of either
or both of the corporations involved. Very often such mergers
will involve a revision of the capital structure of one or both of
the merging companies. The shareholders will be asked to turn
to their stock and receive therefor stock in the new corporation,
which stock may not carry with it the rights and incidents that
accompanied the relinguished shares. Such consolidations are
usually attempted under an authorizing statute, so the stock-
holder who feels that his rights are infringed may complain that
the statute is unconstitutional.
The problems arising out of mergers and changes of the cor-
porate enterprise involve many of the rights that have been
previously discussed, but since they arise in a different manner
a brief treatment here will not be entirely repetitious.
It is clear at the outset that if a statute authorizes a merger
to be consummated in such a way as to divest the shareholders
of either corporation of vested rights, that statute would be held
unconstitutional as a denial of due process of law.76 Further-
more, mergers will be enjoined when they force the shareholders
to relinquish their holdings at less than their actual value,7 7
to indicate whether or not the pre-emptive right to suscribe to new shares
is reserved.
75 Supra, note 74. See also Morawetz, Pre-emptive Right Of Sharehold-
ers, 42 Harv. Law Rev. 186; Berle & Means, Modern Corporation And
Private Property, p. 247.
76 Outwater v. Public Service Corporation (1928) 103 N. J. E. 461, 143
Atl. 729. In this case the merger involved an exchange of voting stock for
non-voting stock, and since the right to vote was held a vested right the
merger was enjoined. Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (1909)
194 N. Y. 212, 87 N. E. 443. Here again the corporate change was enjoined
in so far as it deprived a shareholder of his right to vote.77Jones v. Missouri Edison Electric Co. (1906) 144 Fed. 765. The
merger attempted in this case was surrounded by a strong odor of fraud,
so the decision is really based on the concept that the directors and the
majority stockholders exerting control stand in a fiduciary capacity.
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their effect being practically a taking of property without due
process of law.
It is apparent from the previous discussion of the shareholder's
individual incidents, that if the stockholder's constitutional pro-
tection is dependent upon his establishing vested rights as to
each incident he wishes to protect, he will be afforded a very
meager protection. Most of the merger cases bear out the general
rule that the majority of the shareholder's rights are not vested
rights, and therefore a merger statute authorizing an alteration
of these rights is a valid exercise of the reserve power.7 8 Further-
more, statutes authorizing the buying off of shareholders who do
not assent to a merger have also been upheld under the reserve
power.79
Once more, if we take a different tack, and consider the con-
tractual elements involved, different results can be reached on
a more logical basis, and the shareholder can be given more pro-
tection. Mergers often involve a change of dividend rights, par
values and voting rights. It has previously been shown that these
are matters of contract between the stockholders inter sese or
between the corporation and the stockholders, and that it cannot
be logically held that the reserve power extends to thesd matters.
Thus a merger statute which ultimately altered these rights
would be as much an impairment of contractual obligations as
any statute directly changing them. Outwater v. Public Service
Corporation" adopts this approach, the traditional New Jersey
view, and holds that merger legislation, enacted under the reserve
power cannot effect a perversion of the contractual obligations
of the stockholders inter sese. Such a view, which might at first
appear to be too strict, would not prevent all corporate mergers,
78 Colby v. Equitable Trust Co. (1908) 124 App. Div. 262, 108 N. Y. S.
978; Atlantic Refining Co. v. Hodgman (1926) 13 Fed. (2d) 718; Lord v.
Equitable Life Insurance Society (1909) 194 N. Y. 212, 87 N. E. 443;
Allen v. Ajax Mining Co. (1904) 30 Mont. 490, 77 Pac. 47; Bigelow v.
Calumet & Hecla Mining Co. (1909) 167 Fed. 721; Polk v. Mutual Reserve
Fund Ass'n of N. Y. (1907) 207 U. S. 310, 52 L. Ed. 222; Globe v. Erie
County Mutual Ins. Co. (1902) 169 N. Y. 613, 62 N. E. 1096; Windhurst v.
Central Leather Co. (1927) 101 N. J. E. 543, 138 Atl. 772.
79 Winfree v. Riverside Cotton Mills Co. (1912) 113 Va. 717, 75 S. E.
309; Allen v. Ajax Mining Co. (1904) 20 Mont. 490, 77 Pac. 47; see Cook,
Corporations (8th ed.) Sec. 2623.
80 (1928) 103 N. J. E. 461, 143 At]. 729.
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but it would require that stockholders' rights be converted rather
than destroyed."
A change or extension of the corporate enterprise may affect
the incidents of the shareholder's status, although it does not
directly alter them. Such a change might subject the corporate
assets to incumbrances not intended at the time of incorporation,
and it might force the shareholder into a business entirely differ-
ent than that planned when he purchased his stock. That the
stockholder is not without protection, merely because his rights
may be only indirectly affected, is shown by the case of Zabriskie
v. Hackensack & New York Railroad Co.82 In that case a four-
teen mile extension of the railroad, authorized by an amendment
passed under the reserve power, was enjoined on the ground
that it would change the corporate enterprise. Again the New
Jersey court points out that the reserve power does not authorize
a change of the rights of the corporators as between themselves.
83
CONCLUSION
Throughout this paper an attempt has been made to point out
the various ways in which the incidents of the shareholder's
status in a corporation might be protected by constitutional
limitations, and to further show how the courts have treated
these possibilities. It has been found that in most of the states
the legislatures, with the reserved power to alter, amend, and
repeal corporate charters at their disposal, are limited only by
the due process clause of the United States Constitution, and
81 Supra, note 80. See also Windhurst v. Central Leather Co. (1927)
101 N. J. E. 543, 138 Atl. 772. This Windhurst Case might at first glance
seem contra to the usual New Jersey view, but it must be noted that the
plaintiff failed to show any injury, and furthermore he seems to have been
guilty of laches.
82 (1867) 18 N. J. E. 178.
83 Zabriskie v. Hackensack etc. R. Co. (1867) 18 N. J. E. 178 "It is
also settled, upon the principles of the common law, in this state and in
most states of the Union, that when a number of persons associate them-
selves as partners, for a business and time specified in the agreement be-
tween them, or become members of a corporation for definite purposes and
objects specified in their charter, which in such case is their contract, and
for a time settled by it, that the objects and business of the partnership
or corporation cannot be changed, or abandoned, or sold out, within the time
specified, without the consent of all the corporators or partners; one partner
or corporator, however small his interest, can prevent it. And this is so,
although by law, a majority in either case can control or manage the busi-
ness against the will and interest of the minority so long as it is within the
scope of the partnership or the charter."
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that this constitutes a negligible limitation, since few, if any, of
the stockholder's incidents are rated as vested rights.
The other view, which seems to have been adopted by the un-
imposing minority of three states, has been supported here, not
because it affords the poor victimized stockholder more protec-
tion, but because it seems the more logically and legally correct.
It more fully comprehends the nature of the corporate set-up and
more clearly distinguishes the various elements and interests
involved.
A better conception of the reserve power would make it some-
thing analogous to the police power. That is, it should be used
to alter or amend corporate charters only when the general
public interest requires such action, instead of every time a
corporation lobbyist may suggest it.
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